A “toxic workplace culture” was one of several contributing factors that led to the implosion of the Titan submersible on its way to the Titanic, a report has said.
The US Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation (MBI) said in its report into Oceangate – the private company that owned the submersible – that “the loss of five lives was preventable”.
Titan operator Stockton Rush, who founded OceanGate; two members of a prominent Pakistani family, Shahzada Dawood and his son Suleman; British adventurer Hamish Harding; and Titanic expert and the sub’s pilot, Paul-Henri Nargeolet, died on board.
On Tuesday, a 335-page report into the disaster went on to make 17 safety recommendations, which MBI chairman Jason Neubauer said will help prevent future tragedies.
The investigation’s report found that the submersible’s design, certification, maintenance and inspection process were all inadequate.
It also highlighted the fact that the company failed to look into known past problems with the hull, and that issues with the expedition were not monitored in real time and acted upon.
‘Intimidation tactics’
The report states that contributing factors to the disaster included OceanGate’s safety culture and operational practices being critically flawed, and an “ineffective whistleblower process” as part of the Seaman’s Protection Act – a US federal law designed to protect the rights of seamen.
The report adds that the firing of senior staff members and the looming threat of being fired were used to dissuade employees and contractors from expressing safety concerns.
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Titan submersible: ‘What was that bang?’
It alleges: “For several years preceding the incident, OceanGate leveraged intimidation tactics, allowances for scientific operations, and the company’s favourable reputation to evade regulatory scrutiny.
“By strategically creating and exploiting regulatory confusion and oversight challenges, OceanGate was ultimately able to operate Titan completely outside of the established deep-sea protocols, which had historically contributed to a strong safety record for commercial submersibles.”
The report states that the chief executive was allowed to “completely ignore vital inspections, data analyses, and preventative maintenance procedures”, which “culminated in a catastrophic event”.
Lead investigator Thomas Whalen and marine board chairman Mr Neubauer said there was evidence Mr Rush had committed “potential criminal offences”, namely “misconduct or neglect of ship officers”.
Had he survived the incident, he would have faced a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison, the report says.
Numerous OceanGate employees have come forward in the two years since the implosion to support those claims.
OceanGate suspended operations in July 2023 and has not commented on the MBI’s report.
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The Titan sub went missing on its voyage to the wreck of the Titanic.
After five frantic days of searching, the wreckage was eventually found on the ocean floor roughly 500m from the sunken Titanic.
The MBI investigation was launched shortly after the disaster.
During two weeks of testimony in September 2024, the former OceanGate scientific director said the Titan malfunctioned during a dive just a few days before it imploded.
OceanGate’s former operations boss also told the panel the sub was a huge risk and the company was only focused on profit.
The board said one challenge of the investigation was that “significant amounts” of video footage evidence that had been captured by witnesses was not subject to its subpoena authority because the witnesses weren’t American citizens.
